Marquette Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 4 June 1934

Article 11

Negligence: Res Ipsa Loquitor: Common Carriers
Parke G. Young

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Parke G. Young, Negligence: Res Ipsa Loquitor: Common Carriers, 18 Marq. L. Rev. 265 (1934).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol18/iss4/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

RECENT DECISIONS
The legislatures have designated what type of investment may be made by
guardians and those legally charged with the administration of trust funds. The
statutes are specific. (See sec. 231.32, Wis. Stat., 1933). If the guardian follows
the course laid down by the statutes he is protected against any future responsibility for loss arising out of the investment which he may select. In the instant
case the guardian had elected a course other than that prescribed by the statutes
and in so doing he lost the protection which the legislature had attempted to provide; see, 20 Pa. Stats. Ch. 801; In re Taylor's Estate, supra; U. S. F. & G. Co.
v. Taggart, (Tex Civ. App., 1917) 194 S.W. 482. The guardian may not follow
the "statutory course" and if he uses good faith and due care and prudence
working for the best pecuniary interests of his ward, he will not be responsible
for any loss arising out of the transaction, Lamar v. Micon, 112 U.S. 452, 5 Sup.
Ct. 221, 28 L.Ed. 751 (1884) ; Corcoran v. Kostrometinoff, supra. (The transac-

tion has been an investment.)
The strict application of the letter of the law doubtlessly places the loss on
the guardian. Due care on his part in depositing the funds for a certain period
is rendered ineffective where he fails to bring himself within the statute or cannot show he was seeking an investment when the loss is incurred.
C. A. L
NEGLIGENCE-RES IPSA LOQUITOR-CO01XMON CAmuERs-The plaintiff, a passenger in a bus, operated by the defendant, a common carrier, was injured when
the bus struck the rear of an automobile being operated by a third person. The
plaintiff was thrown from her seat to the floor of the bus. The complaint set
forth general allegations of negligence. At the trial the plaintiff introduced no
specific facts to show fault on the part of the bus driver or any other employee
of the defendant. The trial court did take notice of an Ohio statute which provided that no person should drive any motor vehicle at a greater rate of speed
than would permit him to stop within the assured clear distance ahead. (Cf. sec.
85.32, .40, Wis. Stats., 1933). The trial court permitted the case to go to a jury
and the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff. Judgment was entered on the verdict. Held, on appeal, the record failed to support the verdict. The mere happening on an injury to a passenger without a showing of a definite breach of
duty by the carrier is insufficient in law to constitute a ground of actionable negligence. Hall v. Custom Motor Coach, Inc., (Ohio, 1934) 189 N.E. 505.
It is conceded that a common carrier owes its passengers the highest degree
of care consistent with the transaction of its business. Scales v. Boynton Cab Co.,
198 Wis. 293, 223 N.W. 836, 69 A.L.R. 379 (1929). The carrier's responsibility,
however, is not absolute. There must be something in the record to support a
finding of fault. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked to help the
plaintiff-passenger in some situations where it would be difficult for him to know
definitely what the carrier's employees had failed to do or to discover what they
had done improperly. This is particularly true in collision cases, and the doctrine
is generally applied where the collision occurs between two vehicles operated
and directed by the same defendant carrier, North Chi. St. Ry. Co. v. Cotton,
140 Ill. 486, 29 N.E. 899 (1892). The carrier is expected to explain how the
collision occured because his employees have been in a better position than the
plaintiff to have seen what happened. In the instant case one of the vehicles
was not operated by anyone employed by the defendant. This is a typical situation in the bus cases. Whether a plaintiff in such a case should be in a position
to make out a prima facie case by showing merely the happening of the collision,
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and the relationship between himself and the defendant, is a matter of policy
upon which the courts are not in accord. In the instant case the court decided
against the plaintiff. Perhaps in most jurisdictions the decision would be for the
plaintiff on this question. Robinson v. McAllister, 216 Cal. 312, 13 P. (2d.) 926
(1932). The problem of pleading is tied to the problem of proof. General allegations of negligence will be sufficient if the passenger does not have to show
anything by way of specific facts as evidence of fault to get to the jury. Guaranty Casualty Co. v. Am. Milling Co., 169 Wis. 426, 172 N.W. 148 (1919);
Klien v. Butian, 169 Wis. 385, 172 N.W. 736, 5 A.L.R. 1237 (1920). It has been
held in some cases that plaintiffs may show for example, that the bus was being
driven at a high rate of speed, or without proper lights, where the complaint had
set out negligence in general terms, Omaha & C. B. St. Ry. Co. v. McKeesnan,
250 Fed. 386, 162 C.C.A. 456 (1928) ; Carnahanv. Motor Trans. Co., 65 Cal. App.
402, 424 P. 143 (1924).
Which is the better way of handling these cases is for the court in each
jurisdiction to decide for itself. Because of the relationship between the parties,
the public nature of the defendant's calling, the difficulties facing the plaintiff
in building up a case, and the position of the carrier's employees who ought to
know what happened, it would seem that these are cases where the courts should
compel the defendant to satisfy the jury that the accident occured through no
fault of its employees.

P. G. Y.
ToRrs-FAuLSE IMPRISONMENT-OFFICERs' RIGHT TO DETAIN NoN-RESIDENT
DRivERs FOR INVESTIGATION.-A non-resident while driving his car was stopped
by police officers, who believed that the car was a stolen one. Having determined
that it was not the car reported as stolen, the officers took the driver into custody when he could not produce licenses as required in the state where he was arrested. The driver contended that the law in the state of his residence did not require such license. After an investigation which took a substantial time, the truth
of the driver's contention was ascertained and he was released. An action for false
imprisonment was commenced on the theory that the detention was unlawful ab
initio. Held, On appeal, that the circumstances (suspicion of a felony) existing
at the time of the arrest was sufficient justification for the detention. Pine et al
v. Okzewski et al. (N.J., 1934) 170 Atl. 825.
There is interesting dicta in the instant case tending to justify the detention,
not because there was suspicion of a felony but because there was suspicion of
a misdemeanor (see points 6 to 11, incl., pp. 828 to 830). Reasonable grounds
for suspecting a misdemeanor is no defense to a false imprisonment action when
in fact no misdemeanor was committed. Stewart v. Freeley, 118 Iowa 524, 92
N.W. 670 (1902), (vagrancy); Daniels et. al. v. Millstead, 221 Ala. 353, 128 So.
447 (1930), (failure to have hunting license) ; Martin v. Golden, 180 Mass. 549,
62 N.E. 977 (1902), (vagrancy); Tillman v. Beard, 121 Mich. 480, 80 N.W. 248,
46 L.R.A. 215 (1899), (no vendor's license).
The Wisconsin court, in a case involving failure to have proper license plates
on a car, has held that if it reasonably appears to the officer that a misdemeanor
is being committed he does not have to justify the arrest by showing a misdemeanor is in fact being committed. Bursack v. Davis, 199 Wis. 115, 225 N.W. 738
(1929). In the instant case the statutes, (Comp. St. N.J. Supp. 135-49 et seq.),
giving the officer power to arrest drivers for failure to have in their possession
the required licenses, were construed to permit the officer to detain a non-

